This week, under its new leadership, the government has abandoned plans to reduce the number of jury trials in England and Wales, following considerable opposition from lawyers, who successfully argued that trial by jury has been a fundamental part of our justice system for centuries and must remain integral to it.
The original proposals had been prompted by the enormous backlog of cases in the Crown Courts and would have meant that defendants facing a likely sentence of less than three years would have been tried by a judge rather than a jury. The government has now changed course, although some complex and lengthy fraud and financial cases will still be eligible for judge-only trials. There are currently more than 80,000 cases waiting to be heard in the Crown Courts, so the problem that prompted the proposals is not going away and is predicted to be an ongoing issue in both England and Wales.
In this same week, I found myself listening to my favourite true crime podcast; don’t judge me, please, I’d rather be convicted by a jury of my peers. The presenter was talking about jury systems in different countries and mentioned the fact that not all juries deliberate. In some systems (the one under discussion was in Brazil), jurors hear the evidence and then vote: no discussion, no deliberation. They do not retire to a room and try to persuade or influence each other, and there is no concept of reaching a collective conclusion.
Listening to this discussion, I realised that I had simply assumed that deliberation was what a jury did. You hear a case, you go away and talk about it, and eventually you come back with a verdict. But why? And is it actually the right way to go about things? When I looked into it, I found not only that deliberation is not a universal feature of trial by jury, but also that the idea that a jury should discuss and deliberate is not particularly ancient. To my shame, I had no knowledge (or perhaps more accurately no recollection) of whether deliberation was baked into the systems used in the ancient world, from which we so proudly claim our heritage. So this week, I refreshed my knowledge.
The Athenian courts used very large juries, often numbering 201, 401 or 501 citizens, and sometimes considerably more. Remember that Athens was a city-state rather than a country (given its global influence, this is easy to forget): fundamentally, we are talking a very small society, so trials within the city would have been everybody’s business. After hearing the speeches and the evidence, the jurors voted by secret ballot. There was no deliberation in that they did not formally discuss the case before reaching their decision, although with numbers that large I struggle to believe that there wasn’t some general chit-chat and therefore there must have been some influencing going on. The votes were counted and the majority decided the case (hence, presumably, the pointedly odd number of jurors). The very concept that juries must reach a unanimous verdict, or at least (and judges are really not keen on this) an overwhelming majority) is a more modern one.
The fact that there was no formal discussion in Athens, the cradle of the Socratic method and the birthplace of democracy, has really given me pause for thought: they genuinely must have believed that no discussion was better, for it’s not as if they were a society that did not value the concept of deliberative discussion: philosophical debate pretty much defined what it meant to be the best kind of citizen. I then looked at how the Romans (obviously, in time, a much bigger society) did things. It turns out that they had something broadly similar to the Athenians. A panel of jurors heard the case and then voted to establish a majority decision. Secret ballots were introduced in the second century BC, an indication that there were concerns about undue influence from others, even when discussion was not officially taking place.
I remain convinced that there are flaws in these systems and that there was no doubt undue and unwanted influence abound. My point isn’t that the Athenians and Romans had somehow invented a better system and that we have been doing it wrong ever since. Their legal systems were very different from ours, and neither would look remotely familiar to a modern British defendant: for example, they were absolutely terrible at separating facts and evidence from character, and they tended to assume that individuals from certain classes were more or less likely to be the “type” of person that would behave in an anti-social manner: cases tended to be won and lost on the notion of “would this kind of guy have done this kind of thing?” But looking back at the ancient systems does make one thing rather clear: the idea that a jury must deliberate is not an inevitable consequence of having a group of people decide a case. So when did deliberation get baked into our system?
The roots of the English jury are usually traced to Henry II. Henry ordered groups of local men to report to royal officials those who were suspected of serious crimes, and similar groups were used to settle disputes over land and other matters. These early jurors were not the impartial strangers that we hold as the backbone of our system today, rather they were expected to have knowledge of the people and events involved and to report what they knew. This is the literal opposite of the modern ideal, in which jurors must theoretically have no prior knowledge of the defendant and his or her case (something which is becoming increasingly difficult in a world where information is so readily available). The English jury gradually changed as the legal system developed, particularly after the decline of trial by ordeal in the early thirteenth century. Over time, jurors moved from being people who were expected to know the facts of a case themselves towards being people who heard evidence presented in court and decided what could be established from it. But the modern jury of twelve impartial strangers listening to competing evidence is largely a nineteenth-century development, and the juries we recognise today, drawn from men and women across the social spectrum, are considerably more recent: women became legally eligible in 1919, but the property qualification (which in reality barred the overwhelming majority of women from serving) was not removed until 1972.
So, the earliest juries in England were not groups of strangers brought together to listen to evidence in a courtroom and then decide what had happened. Their role was originally much closer to reporting what they knew about the “facts”. This must have been spectacularly open to corruption, just as I believe the Athenian and Roman systems were. Over time, the English jury became less self-informing and increasingly became a body which heard the evidence presented at trial and decided on the facts. The transformation was gradual rather than a single moment when somebody apparently announced that henceforth twelve people should go into a room and talk about it.
The fact that the modern jury’s verdict has to be post-discussion and unanimous has caused problems over the years, and our modern system has relatively recently accepted that unanimity is not always possible. Majority verdicts were introduced in England and Wales by the Criminal Justice Act 1967 and later incorporated into the Juries Act 1974. A jury of twelve can reach a verdict if ten or eleven jurors agree. The jury must first have spent at least two hours deliberating, and the court must be satisfied that they have had a reasonable opportunity to reach a unanimous verdict, all of which indicates that the system doesn’t really favour the concept: unanimity is always considered preferable.
When I was at a particularly tender age, I saw the classic film Twelve Angry Men and became somewhat obsessed with it: as a child of the 1980s I am not a huge fan of black and white films, but Twelve Angry Men remains my favourite film to this day. The portrayal of those twelve flawed, frustrated men sitting around a table, each bringing their own anxieties and prejudices to the situation, gradually persuaded by one charismatic juror, who slowly convinces everyone else that they have got the wrong end of the stick, has stayed with me for life. Yet in Athens and in Rome, just as now in Brazil and other countries, the absence of deliberation was part of the point. The secret ballot and independent voting were attempts to make it difficult for an influential individual to sway the others. The decision was supposed to emerge from a large number of independent judgements rather than from whatever happened in the jury room. This, combined with the backlog we are facing in our current system, has really got me thinking: have we actually got this wrong?
If you have seen any of the Channel 4 experiments entitled The Jury, you too may have some questions about the process. In the UK, jurors are forbidden to discuss their deliberations outside the jury room, no cameras are allowed and no records are kept. In many ways, this is wonderful: the jury are isolated in a bubble and nobody can interfere with their discussion. Twelve people bring nothing but themselves to the table and the idea is a noble one. The problem, of course, is that there is no way of telling whether juries are deliberating within the parameters that their duties demand, nor whether the discussion is being conducted in an appropriate and fair manner. We simply do not know. This is why Channel 4 came up with the idea of re-enacting three particularly complex trials, with actors playing the defendant, the witnesses and the legal professionals. The juries, by contrast, are made up of ordinary people, who then go of to deliberate in the same way that the real jury did, albeit with some distinct differences to make it more interesting television: for example, the jurors discuss the case while evidence is being presented and they often do so in small groups, neither of which would be allowed in a real trial.
If you watch the Channel 4 experiments, two things become overwhelmingly and depressingly apparent. Firstly, almost none of the jurors appear to have any understanding of their duties: most particularly, they do not appear to grasp the true meaning of evidence or of reasonable doubt. They appear unable to think within the parameters within which a jury is duty-bound to operate and they struggle to keep their discussion within those bright lines, which I found genuinely alarming: they made their decisions based upon how they felt, and in some cases according to how they wanted the world to be, not on the basis of what was in front of them nor within the confines of their legal duty. Secondly, the discussions that were filmed in all three experiments were wholly at the mercy of group dynamics, meaning that people descended into tribal behaviour and competitiveness. The most dominant characters swayed the others and the process was more about certain individuals winning than it was about twelve people using their collective judgement to come to the most probable conclusion. In all honesty, it really gave me pause.
Despite my reservations, I do cling to the notion that jury systems are essential and that a legal system in which citizens are judged entirely by legal experts, however carefully we separate the law-makers from the law-enforcers, is potentially open to corruption. Certain high-profile cases in which citizens have been prosecuted for exercising their right to free speech, most of which were thrown out swiftly by the jury process, might not have gone the same way were a judge in charge. If you find this hard to believe, it is the position held by the Free Speech Union, who have supported many of these individuals with their legal costs. I would be genuinely aghast to see the jury system disappear, and I do not believe that simply removing it will solve the problem of the huge backlog of cases we have: there are multiple other factors at play that have caused this, not least the woeful lack of investment in our legal systems.
So, here is a thought experiment for you. I am going to reduce the backlog and I offer my consultancy to the current government (or indeed any government: this one-woman think-tank is non-partisan) and I offer it for free. Are you ready? Here goes.
What if the jury voted first?
Imagine if our twelve jurors were to hear the evidence and then, before anyone had the opportunity to influence anyone else, each made an independent decision and voted by secret ballot. If the result were unanimous, 11–1 or 10–2, the verdict could simply stand. There would be no need to spend another two hours, two days or two weeks in a room deliberating, or trying to persuade one or two dissenting jurors to change their minds.
If the result were 9–3, or indeed any other combination (or, I would suggest, the jurors should perhaps have the right to abstain and thus indicate their desire for deliberation), the jury would retire and discuss the case. In my system, we would reserve the discussion for cases in which there was actually something to discuss. No faffing about with retiring when there is a majority verdict ready to go.
Now, I know what you’re thinking. What if the one or two people who disagree with the other ten are the ones who are right? Indeed, that may be precisely why we have deliberation. The point of putting twelve people together is not simply to count their opinions but to give them an opportunity to notice things that other people may have have missed. Perhaps the quiet juror who says, “Hang on, what about this?” is the person who stops ten people making a terrible mistake. Certainly, that is what is played out in the film Twelve Angry Men and it is the idealistic basis, I suspect, of our system. The thing is, in reality I’m not sure that’s how it actually works based on what I’ve seen and what several other people have, albeit illegally, given me a hint as to how discussions played out when they have sat on a jury.
Perhaps we should consider the idea that there is a danger in deliberation. Once people start talking, they are no longer making independent judgements. Some people are more confident and/or articulate than others; some embrace the idea that changing their mind is strength and recognise that it is part of the deliberation process, others see it as a weakness and bed in. A strong personality can dominate a discussion, while somebody who has spotted something important may be reluctant to keep arguing once everyone else seems to have reached a conclusion. The Athenians were clearly aware of the dangers. Their decision to use large juries, secret ballots and no deliberation was not simply an absence of sophisticated procedure: it was a deliberate way of protecting the independence and sanctity of each individual juror.
So, this brings us to the crucial question, which to be honest I am still pondering: what exactly is deliberation for? I don’t know whether my rather crude suggestion of voting first and deliberating only if necessary would actually make our jury system better, but I would wager that it might speed up the process. There are no doubt all sorts of practical and legal problems that I haven’t even begun to consider, and I await with anticipation the better legal minds that will no doubt come for me on this. But I honestly think it is worth us asking whether deliberation is always for the best.
