On legends and identity

Legends occupy an uncertain territory between lived experience and imagination. Across the ancient world, people explained their origins through stories that blended fragments of history with self-conscious invention. Sometimes these traditions preserve genuine echoes of the past: archaeological discoveries at sites once dismissed as mythical, such as ancient Troy itself, have shown that beneath the layers of poetry there can indeed lie traces of historical reality. Yet legends can also reveal more about the societies that tell them than about the events they supposedly describe. They express the aspirations, fears, ambitions and identity of the people who weaved those tales. Few examples illustrate this more clearly than the Roman claim to Trojan ancestry — the belief that the people who built the Roman Republic and later the Roman Empire were descended from refugees who escaped the destruction of Troy after the legendary Trojan War. It is something my students ask frequently: is it true?

For centuries, educated Romans accepted, celebrated and elaborated this tradition. According to the received version of the story, the Trojan prince Aeneas fled the burning city carrying his aged father Anchises on his shoulders and leading his young son Ascanius by the hand. A few survivors, the handful of Trojans citizens who had not been killed by the Greeks, went with him. After years of wandering across the Mediterranean sea, a handful of travel-weary and traumatised survivors arrived in Italy, where Aeneas’s descendants would eventually establish the line leading to Romulus, the founder of Rome. The myth became one of the foundational narratives of Roman civilisation, immortalised most famously in the Aeneid, composed by Virgil during the reign of Augustus in the late first century BC.

The question that many of my students ask is whether there was any truth behind the story. Were the Romans genuinely descended from refugees from Asia Minor (modern Turkey), or was the claim merely a literary invention that helped the Romans to ally themselves with the ancient Greek heroic tradition that they so admired? Modern historians overwhelmingly regard the Trojan ancestry of Rome as mythical, yet the myth itself remains historically significant precisely because it reveals so much about Roman identity and about the ways that civilisations construct their own past and define their own identity.

The roots of the story stretch back into the complex cultural world of the early Mediterranean. The city of Troy, located in north-western Anatolia near the Dardanelles in modern Turkey, was long thought by many scholars to be entirely fictional, the invention of Greek epic poetry. That changed dramatically in the 19th century, when excavations led by Heinrich Schliemann uncovered the remains of a substantial ancient settlement at Hisarlik, now widely identified as the site of Troy and a UNSECO world heritage site. Archaeology has demonstrated that several cities occupied the site over many centuries, and one layer appears to have suffered destruction during the Late Bronze Age, roughly corresponding to the traditional period assigned to the Trojan War. Although historians remain cautious about treating Homeric poetry as literal history, there is now broad agreement that the legends of Troy’s destruction probably contain at least the distant memories of a real conflict in the eastern Mediterranean during the Bronze Age.

Yet even if Troy itself was real, that does not mean that the Romans were descended from Trojans. The earliest inhabitants of Latium, the region around Rome, were Italic peoples who spoke Latin, an Indo-European language closely related to other regional dialects. Archaeological evidence indicates a continuity of settlement and gradual social development in central Italy rather than the arrival of a conquering or colonising population from Anatolia. Early Roman culture seems to have emerged from interactions among Latins, Sabines, Etruscans and other Italian peoples over several centuries. There is no concrete evidence for a mass migration of Anatolians to Italy.

The Trojan story appears instead to have developed gradually through contact with Greek culture. From the 8th century BC, Greek colonies spread across southern Italy and Sicily, bringing Greek language, religion and literature into close contact with the peoples of the Italian peninsula. As Rome grew in power, Roman elites became increasingly fascinated by Greek civilisation. Greek mythology provided a rich reservoir of heroic narratives through which emerging states could interpret their origins and ambitions. As I like to point out to my students, every educated Roman would have been steeped in the language and the stories of Homer, in a similar fashion to how the educated elite were steeped in the bible during the Renaissance. The heoric stories were central to the identity of every well-informed Roman.

Aeneas appeared as a relatively minor figure in Greek epic tradition, long before the Romans adopted him. In Homer’s Iliad, he is presented as a Trojan noble favoured by the gods and destined to survive the war. Greek writers later elaborated stories about his wanderings after the fall of Troy, and by the 6th century BC some traditions had linked him with settlements in Italy. The Romans eventually embraced and transformed these stories into a national identity.

This transformation reached its most influential form under Augustus. Emerging victorious from decades of civil war, Augustus sought not only political authority but ideological legitimacy. Rome needed a story to explain both its greatness and its suffering. Virgil’s Aeneid supplied that story with extraordinary literary power. Written between approximately 29 and 19 BC and (we think, at least) at the behest of Augustus, the poem deliberately echoed Homer while presenting Rome under Augustus as the culmination of a divine historical destiny.

In Virgil’s telling, Aeneas embodies virtues that the Romans admired deeply: duty, endurance, piety and self-sacrifice. He is not merely a wandering exile but the chosen instrument of fate. The sufferings of Troy become the prelude to Rome’s future empire. Jupiter himself promises that from Aeneas’s descendants will arise a people destined to rule the world, parcere subiectis et debellare superbos: to show mercy to those that submit and to grind down the resistors in war. The poem thus transformed a refugee narrative into a self-conscious justification of imperial rule.

The political usefulness of this mythology was immense. Augustus claimed descent through his adoptive family, the Julii, from Aeneas’s son Ascanius, also somewhat handily known, we are told, as Iulus, a monumentally twisted fudge by Virgil, which has always amised me. Since Aeneas was said to be the son of the goddess Venus, the Julian line acquired divine ancestry, which Augustus referenced in his statuary and architecture. It elevated him above ordinary politics and linked the new imperial regime with a sacred and thus unquestionable destiny. In this sense, the Trojan myth functioned less as objective history than as ideological theatre, something which Augustus and those around him turned out to be phenomenally good at. Yet it would be mistaken to dismiss the myth simply as cynical propaganda. The Romans genuinely cared about ancestry and tradition, and many educated Romans seem to have accepted the Trojan story sincerely, or at least treated it as culturally meaningful.

Ancient attitudes toward myth differed considerably from modern expectations of historical accuracy. Myth and history were not always sharply separated categories. A story could be morally, spiritually or politically “true” even if its factual basis was uncertain. Roman authors occasionally displayed scepticism about legendary traditions, but they rarely rejected them outright. The historian Livy, writing during Augustus’s reign, admitted the uncertainty surrounding Rome’s earliest past while still recounting the traditional narratives. In the preface to his history of Rome, he observed that accounts of the remote past are “more fitted to adorn the creations of the poet than the genuine records of the historian.” Yet he proceeded to include them because they formed part of Rome’s cultural inheritance.

The appeal of Trojan ancestry also reflected Rome’s complicated relationship with Greece. Roman elites admired Greek art, philosophy, literature and education profoundly. At the same time, Rome was busy conquering the Greek world and often sought to define itself as distinct from and superior to Greek culture and its values. Claiming Trojan descent offered an elegant solution to this cultural cognitive dissonance. The Trojans belonged to the heroic universe of Greek epic, granting Rome prestigious ancient connections, but they were not themselves Greek: in fact, within Homeric tradition, they were indeed the enemies of the Greeks. Rome could therefore position itself as both heir to and rival of Greek civilisation. There may also even have been diplomatic advantages to the myth. Throughout antiquity, claims of shared ancestry could shape alliances and political relationships. Roman leaders sometimes invoked Trojan connections when dealing with eastern Mediterranean cities that traced their own histories back to the Trojan world. Mythology could function as a form of soft power long before the modern term existed.

Modern scholarship has approached the Trojan question from several directions, including archaeology, linguistics, comparative mythology and most recently genetics. None has produced convincing evidence that supports a literal Trojan origin for the Romans. Linguistic evidence is particularly important. The language associated with Bronze Age Troy remains uncertain, although scholars often connect the region with Anatolian languages such as Luwian, which belonged to a separate branch of the Indo-European language family. Latin, by contrast, evolved firmly within the Italic branch of languages. This strongly suggests that the ancestors of the Romans developed within the Italian peninsula rather than migrating from Anatolia in historical times.

Modern genetic studies likewise indicate that the population of ancient Italy was shaped by complex patterns of migration and interaction extending over millennia. Like most Mediterranean peoples, the Romans emerged from multiple layers of ancestry. While it is entirely possible that individuals from Anatolia reached Italy through trade, warfare, slavery or selective migration, there is no evidence for a distinct founding population. The Mediterranean was interconnected long before Rome’s rise and human mobility was common. But this broad interconnectedness differs greatly from the dramatic national migration imagined by Rome’s foundational myth.

Myths are not rendered meaningless simply because they are not literally true. In many respects, the Roman belief in their Trojan ancestry accomplished precisely what successful national myths are meant to accomplish: it gave people a shared story about who they were and why their civilisation mattered. The myth linked suffering with destiny, exile with triumph and destruction with renewal. Troy’s fall became the necessary precondition for Rome’s greatness and gave people the hope that greatness can come from indescribable suffering. This theme resonated powerfully with Roman political culture, especially during periods of upheaval, of which there were many. The late Republic had witnessed civil wars, assassinations and social collapse. Virgil’s description of survivors who carried the memory of a ruined homeland toward a future empire possessed enormous emotional force: it allowed the Romans to imagine their hardships as part of a larger, providential narrative.

The endurance of the Trojan myth also reflects the extraordinary influence of Virgil’s poetry. The Aeneid became one of the foundational texts of European civilisation and has been studied continuously for two thousand years. Medieval and Renaissance writers treated Aeneas not merely as a fictional character but as a symbolic ancestor of European political order. Even in modern times, the image of Aeneas fleeing Troy remains one of antiquity’s most recognisable scenes.

Legends rarely survive for millennia unless they speak to something deeper than mere fact. The Roman Trojan myth endured not because it accurately described population movements in the Bronze Age, but because it expressed how the Romans understood themselves. Like many origin stories, it blurred memory, imagination, politics and poetry into a narrative powerful enough to outlive the empire that created it.

Photo by Sergio García on Unsplash

et tu, Brute?

“Good friends, sweet friends, let me not stir you up
To such a sudden flood of mutiny.
They that have done this deed are honourable:
What private griefs they have, alas, I know not,
That made them do it: they are wise and honourable.”

Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Mark Antony’s speech in Act 3 Scene 2.

This week, although it is difficult to know why, I’ve been thinking about imperial assassinations. Goodness knows what has sparked these musings on rebellion, mutiny and the forcible removal of a leader, but something tells me that we have been here before and we will be here again.

Julius Caesar was famously assassinated on the Ides of March in 44 BC because many Roman senators feared that he threatened the Roman Republic. After winning a civil war and famously crossing the Rubicon, Caesar looked rather too comfortable at the top and a group of senators, including some of his closest allies, formed a conspiracy to murder him. They believed that killing Caesar would protect Rome from tyranny and restore the power of the Senate. In reality, instead of saving the Republic, the assassination led to further and prolonged civil wars and ultimately helped to bring about Rome’s future under imperial rule.

Given that the Roman empire was one of the most powerful political systems in history, it is easy to forget just how tenuous an emperor’s grip on power truly was. Roman emperors supposedly held absolute authority, but their position depended upon the support of the senate, the army and the praetorian guard. If any one of those groups withdrew their loyalty, even the strongest ruler could be swiftly removed from office. These days, a man in such a position is forced to resign; in those days, you simply got murdered.

During the height of the empire, particularly from the first to third centuries AD, emperors were commonly assassinated. It’s one of the things that I find students are most puzzled by, perhaps because they have fallen for Roman (particularly Augustan) propaganda and see Rome as exemplary of stable governance. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth. One of the most dramatic examples of an emperor being forcibly removed from office was the assassination of the emperor Caligula in AD 41.

Caligula began his reign with enormous public support. The Roman people celebrated his ascension because he followed Tiberius, who was viscerally disliked, and he was also the son of the wildly popular general, Germanicus, who died very young. At first, Caligula appeared to be generous and charismatic, but his true colours soon became more than apparent and his behaviour towards members of the governing classes became cruel, erratic and humiliating. While ancient accounts may possibly exaggerate his faults (and the stories really are wild), nevertheless his relationship with powerful political groups certainly deteriorated rapidly and beyond repair. His popularity with the Roman people may have maintained his position for a while, but it was the praetorian guard who decided his fate when they assassinated him in his own palace.

The praetorian guard were an elite military unit stationed in Rome, whose purpose was to protect the emperor. By the same token, precisely because they had direct access to the ruler and were always armed, they also had the ability to dispatch them most efficiently. Following the murder of Caligula, many members of the senate wanted to restore the Republic again and abolish the office of emperor altogether, but their power by this time was weakened by the fact that they had already proved themselves impotent in the face of imperial power: most crucially, they lacked control over the army, but they also lacked popular support: the senators’ power had originally been brought down by populist leaders, who had exposed the undeniably self-serving systems set up by the ruling elite to perpetuate their own wealth and power. The decisive factor that ensured the senators were finished in all but name was the praetorian guard, who required an emperor to sign their pay cheques and indeed to justify their position. After Caligula was killed, the praetorians found Caligula’s disabled uncle, Claudius, hiding in the palace and proclaimed him as emperor. Once the military had backed Claudius, following the lead of the praetorian guard, the senate had no leverage to object. The removal of Caligula therefore demonstrates that, although the senate could support or justify the overthrow of an emperor, the men who carried the swords were the ones who decided things.

Another good example of an emperor being decisively removed from office is the fall of Nero. By AD 68, Nero had ruled for fourteen years. Initially he had been guided by capable advisers such as the philosopher Seneca. Early in his reign, he was relatively popular with the people because he sponsored games, artistic performances and public entertainments. His relationship with the senate, however, steadily worsened. Nero executed or forced the suicide of several senators whom he suspected of conspiracy, creating an atmosphere of fear among the traditional ruling aristocracy. His extravagant spending and controversial behaviour also damaged his reputation. But the decisive factor in Nero’s removal was his loss of military support. In AD 68, the governor of Gaul turned against him and shortly afterwards the Spanish governor, Galba, declared himself emperor. The praetorian guard abandoned Nero after being promised rewards by his Spanish rival: as a result, Nero had no protection in Rome, so the senate took the opportunity to declare him a public enemy and authorised his execution. Facing arrest, Nero was forced to take his own life, which was the traditional way for a condemned Roman aristocrat to make a hasty exit: these days, it’s called resigning for the good of the party.

Nero’s downfall once again highlights the importance of the army and the praetorian guard. The senate formally condemned him, but this action was only possible because he had lost the loyalty of the army in the provinces, who were demonstrating their growing political importance by supporting rival claimants such as Galba to the imperial throne. At the same time, the praetorian guard acted once again as chess-masters by switching allegiance when it suited their interests. Nero’s popularity amongst ordinary Romans may have delayed his downfall to some extent: ancient sources suggest that sections of the plebeians remained loyal to him because of his public entertainments and indeed because of his visible clashes with senatorial elite. But public support could not save an emperor once the military and political elite turned against him.

The emperor Commodus provides our final example of how imperial power could collapse. Commodus ruled from AD 180 to 192 and was the son of the respected emperor and philosopher Marcus Aurelius. Quite unlike his stoic father, Commodus became associated with corruption, extravagance and self-indulgence. He preferred gladiatorial games and personal luxury to responsible government and he increasingly alienated the senate by treating their traditional authority and governing experience with contempt. Commodus was quite the character and even participated personally in gladiatorial contests, something that aristocratic Romans found grotesque and degrading for a man of standing.

As Commodus became more paranoid and unstable, leading officials even feared for their lives and eventually members of his inner circle organised a conspiracy against him. An attempt to poison him failed, but ultimately the wrestler Narcissus was hired to strangle him in his bath. The senate immediately triggered the process known as damnatio memoriae, in which official images and references to a ruler were destroyed. This decisive removal of Commodus from public office again illustrates the weakness of emperors who had lost the support of the ruling elite. Although Commodus had attempted to maintain popularity with the masses through games and spectacles, this could not compensate for the hostility he faced among the senators and imperial officials. His death also demonstrates that conspiracies often emerged from within the imperial household itself. Following Commodus’s death, the empire descended into civil war, indicating that no ruler could govern successfully without military backing.

Throughout the height of the Roman Empire, the senate retained political importance but its power was limited compared to that of the army. Senators could legitimise or condemn emperors, as seen with Nero and Commodus, yet they rarely controlled events independently. The Roman army was ultimately the most significant force in removing emperors and the provincial legions frequently proclaimed their own generals emperor, especially during periods of instability. Military loyalty depended heavily on personal leadership and the promise of material rewards as a result of successful campaigns. Soldiers expected their leaders to provide financial bonuses as well as military victories: the two went hand in hand. If an emperor appeared weak, unpopular or incapable of expanding the empire, ambitious generals could and would challenge him. This military influence became even more obvious during the third century, when emperors rose and fell rapidly and the eventual collapse of the empire as we would recognise it became inevitable.

Within this monumental military might, the praetorian guard occupied a unique position due to their physical proximity to the emperor. Unlike distant legions, the guard was stationed in Rome and could intervene directly in palace politics. As seen in the case of Caligula, the guard was more than capable of assassinating the man with whose protection they were supposedly charged. Any passing similarities to UK cabinet members are, of course, entirely coincidental.

Photo by Martti Salmi on Unsplash